Asset Base – there are two camps when reviewing the asset base of a bank. There are the securities that are in the ‘hold to maturity’ camp, and there are securities that are in the ‘available to sell’ camp. SVB held a large percentage of assets in long-term maturity US government treasuries and government-backed bonds, and held these in the ‘hold to maturity’ camp. These were purchased in a period of low interest rates, and as interest rates rose the prices on these securities dropped. Going back to the inverse relationship bonds have with interest rates – even though SVB purchased high-quality government backed bonds/treasuries, the prices of these positions dropped in relation to interest rates increasing. Reports state that SVB sold $21billion worth of bond securities at a $1.8billion loss1, and then stated that they were seeking an additional capital raise to cover these losses. This created the ‘run on the bank’ and the FDIC coming in and closing the bank’s operations.
Deposit Base – SVB’s share of customer deposits above the FDIC guarantee threshold was near 90%2. Several sources estimate that this was the second highest percentage in the US banking system.
Customer Base – SVB’s clientele on both the deposit side and the lending side, were predominantly technology company start-ups and venture capital firms. It is estimated that SVB’s balance sheet increased by over 250% from 2019 to 20222 -> well above all other banks in the US banking system, largely due to the tech sector’s growth during that period. The deposits and activity did not look like a traditional retail bank. SVB is an outlier with a high level of loans plus securities as a percentage of deposits, and very low retail deposits which are much stickier. So, SVB had money going in and coming out at a much larger scale that a traditional bank.